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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

IN RE
GRAKT

~IACFARLAXJ£,

SR.

}

Case
Xo. 9051

HEtiPONDKN'l"S P!';'l'l'l'ION FOR

RJ<jf!EAHING A1'D BHU:GF IX SUP.PORT nn;HJWF

PETITION" FOH REllEARIN<;
'l'hc respondent, Grant lllacfarlane, ~r., IJeti!ion;; tlw
Court for a rehearing and reargument of thi;; ('a.~e upou
the following grounds;
POINT I.
THE COURT HAS 1\'IISINTERPRE'TED THE RECORD
A::-TD THE CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT, AND HAS
APPROVED FI~DT:t--'GS WITHOUT SUPPORTING EVIDEXCE, SO THAT ITS DECISlON SHOULD BE RECALLED
A~D THE CASE REHEARD.
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POINT II.

THE PU)TISHMENT RECOMMENDED BY THE BAR,
AND DECREED BY THE COLRT, IS UNJUST AXD OPPRESSIVE IN VIE\V OF THE RECORD AND THE CIRCUMSTA='!CES OF THIS CASE AND IN COMPARISON WITH
WHAT HAS BEEN DECREED IN EARLIER DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS,

IVHhlH.EFORE, respondent prays that the judgment
and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument
be ordered of the entire case.

A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith.

JOHX H. 8XOW and
HAHOI~D

G. CHRIST.E:.)l"flhl='l

~1ttorney8

for Petitioner.

BRIEF IX SUPPORT 01!'
.PJ£Tl'I'IO.:\ FOH HI•:HJ·;AIUSG
POINT I.
THE COURT HAS MISINTERPRETED THE RECORD
AND THE CONTEKTIO))S OF RESPONDENT, AND HAS
APPROVED FINDINGS WITHOUT SUPPORTING EVI·

DENCE, SO THAT ITS DECISION SHOULD BE RECALLED
AND THE CASE REHEARD.

The Ba1·, throughout this easf'. lw" Jli'YU n't"t'dt'd
from iL~ ,·mwt'.~~ion at til(' pi"l'tl·inl hearil1g that it had
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"no evidence of fraud lw.vond the presumption" announced by this court in the 'viii <'ontbt

ca~c

of In R.:

SK(IIi's Estate,-± "Ctah :!d, :277, 293 P. :.ld 6S:2.

The controversy wa::! litigated, Ly all participant«,
on the issnf' of whether the preSUIHIJtion should he applied
in a discplinary proeeeding lo the E>ame extent as it had
been applied in the civil will eonl.est case.
'l'he entire presentation of tile pro~ccution m this
case consisted of selections rrom the transcript of testimony given on trial ol" ln. lie c'·.,'-u;a.n'.1· EstaiP.
Upon argument to the '!"ri.al Committee, the chief
counsel for the Bar told tilt' TJ"ial ·Committee that he
and his associates, as a _pro~c(·uting committee, lmd eoneluded that the ··matter

mu~t

turn on 1he question of"

whether there is or isn't a IJresumption of fraud in a
di,;bal"l!tent proeeeding.'' (R. 3G!l)
'l'he Trial Committee, in ih derif'ion, found as a. J'ad
that the Court had utilized the prc~ttlllption in the will
contest case, had held the

pn·~umption ~hifted

the burden

of persuasion in that rase to the respondent, and that
he l'ailed to sustain that burden.
The Trial Commillec then concludL·d the· presumption
applied in this di.~ciplinary proet>eding and that the
burden of exoneration

\Hi~

thrust again upou

re~pondent.
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The Board of Bar l'ummis8ioners approved the
F.inding~ and Conclusion::; of the Trial Committee, "-ithout elaboration or comment.
Thus, all members of the Bar conc;orncd ·with the
conduct of this proceeding concluded that the j,;sue bein,,

'

presented to thi;; Court waE the effect, if any, in a di.Rci-

plinary proceeding, of the presumption of fraud and
tmdue influene,D announeed in In Re Snilli'<; Estate.

Becau;:;e of this background, it i;, difficult for

~~~

to understand and to acecpt the remarkable statement
in the decision that the Court is "not con('erncd with the
nicetlcs of the term 'presumption' ... "
It is recognized that the theory of the case and the

issue argued by opposing coumel may not be considered
important by the Court in a matter of discipline. llowever, as seems dear from the
more than ordinary reliance

lia~

ded~ion

of the

been placed h: the Court

upon memben of the Bar and their elected
tives. It is said that tlw Court

~ourt,

df'Pln~

l'f'lll'l'~enla·

it proper "to indnl~e

considerable latitude'· to the adions of the Bar Commission whose members it i~ >'aid are "pernliarl;• suited
to be the arbiters" ol· ,;lmldanh of eondud of

member~

of the Bur.

'l'hc dP('i,.,ion purports lo rf'rlffirlll the rnJr. of proof
111

these kinds nl' m~c:; Uwt 111i~conduet mn~t be proved
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by ''clear and convmemg evidence.'' The Har, however,
lms repeatedly eonceJed that it
!'(·~l~

that its entire case

ha~

no evideme and

upon the prcHumption from !lie

will contest case.
In that case, the Court

expre~;;ly

held that the pref'nmption there

and deliberately

announe~·d

is but "a rule

or law" and the fa.d fimler cannot "<'onsidPr or weigh
the

prc~umpliou

SKrur·.~

as evidence." In Re

Ec,fate, :!!J:l

P. 2d at Page 690.
In the present decision, de::;pitc the unequivocal

language just quo led, the Court has raised the prp;,umption to the

~tatn~

the prc:;tunption

of evidence and
i~

Jw~

held that ·when

recogniy;cd, mere inference::; from

the ''foundational facts'' are magieally tran::;formed into
clear and couvirwing evidence.
II' the inferenees to be drawn 1·1·orn the foundational
caN~

facts in this

have the strength and the power of

clear and eonvineing evidence, then the holding of In

lle Su.'an's f;.,·tate c·annot bo..•
ously, such

inference~

~upported

'vere not

~o

or justified. Obvi-regarded by the

Court in that ease, beeause the Court ther<c held that
thf' inferences could be overeOIJle h;-- a nwre pre}Jolllkrane<! of the evidenee,

11

hid1 wonld not have been the

holding if the Court had concluded that
had the force

a~ j,;

~uC'h inferem:1:~

now atlribnteJ to them.
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His significant to recall that ihe Court, on a record
substantially identical as that now before it, did not
choose on it,; own motion to discipline reRpond~nt following the rendition of the will conte~t decision.
J!'our years have elapsed since In Re S1wn'J E8lute.
X othing has oceurred in the meantime to strengthen or
to enlarge the impact and encct of the inferences \Vhidl
can be drawn from the foundational fads.
'l'hc Bar lm::> never urged

ail)

greater effect from

the inferences than the Court attributed to them in iL;
will contest decision, and both the Bar and the Court,
it would appear, have made a fundamental error in the
•

prosecution and considcmtion of this case .
That error comists in drawing the conclusion that
only one inference can be drawn from these fact8 -

M

.inference of evil. 'J'hc Har and the Court have ignored
any fact or any inference to the credit of I'C''lJOndent,
and have brushed aside as inconsequential any sugge8tion
that at least some favorable inferences ought to be drawn
to the credit or respondent whose denial of misconduct,
whose lifetime ~ivie, vrofr~sional and serviee standing
and reputation, \H'l"l' apparently considered to be of more
force and effect in the will contest ease than in a case
whe1·e hi~ professional life i~ at stake.
In it~ one paragraph o\\llll1W1l'~- or the "i'acts" purportedly found by the 'l'rial Committee, there is ample
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indication that only unfavorable infereneb have been
drawn by the Coul"t from lhi::; record. For example, the

( 'ourt

~tate~

that respondent ·'used his superior position

and talents to ingratiate himself with llCr and to overreach and use undue inl'lncnee in hi~ dealing \vit II her ... "
'l'here

i~

no evidence to support this ;:;tatement, and even

the 'J'rial CommiUce made no l'indings tu thi::; ef.l'ed.

The Court then statP>< that there wa, ''a tnaintenance of joint bank net·ounts and careful protection ol
funds available to respondent ther·cin." Sueh a statement completely

overlook~

the fart that respondent, im-

mrdiately after the death of the ler;tatri:.., delivered a
pa88 book cvideneing the joint w:count with

hi~

dient,

to her executor who, as f'ound b,y the 'l'rial Committee,
was not theretofore aware of its existence. 11', as stated
Ly the Court, respondent had "carefully protec·ted" the

funds available to him in such an aeconnJ, he woulcl
have withdrawn the
te~tatrix

it

i,~

funU::~

prior to the dcatl1 of the

and while she was in her terminal illnes::;, and

unlikely that the existence of this fund would have

ever come to light.

]<;qually untenable i:; the Htatement of the ·Court that
"these matters ·were d~>liberatPly kept ~0rret from anyone
else inclnding

relative~,

'1·ho, it mighl

rcasonahl~· be~~~~~

posed, would haYe aU.vised and rn·otl•dcd hL•r

intl'J't~l;;
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with respect thereto." Xo such finding was made by the
Trial Committee. Mis Swan had but one heir. As i~
amply borne out by later event.~, an.1- advire which might
have been reooivcd from that heir would rertaillly not
have been for the protection of any interest other than
that of the heir. This 11as recognized by :\Iiss S11an,
who repeatedly told her busine>~s advi>wr, the \'ice-President of Walker Bank 6,:. Tru~t Company, of the reasons
why she intended to dispo:;e of her property without

substantial recognition of her heir.
Respondent has never asked this Court to afford

him a "review of the mental process'' of those whose
Finding~

and Conclusions were under attad.:. )!either

has respondent ru;swned that lhis proceeding

follow~

the "usual pattern of a trial and appellate revic1\-." .All
that respondent has ever asked, and all he asks now,
i:> that if he is to be disciplined at the request of the
llar, he should be afforded the "right to a review of the
charges found against him" and that upon sudl. review
this Court should be governed by the
have governed
-

tho~c

~<wne

rules that

who hav02 been charged in the past

that is, that the ''chargE'~ should be clearly sustained

by convincing proof," that tJw l·vidence ·'~hould be clear
:nul ,·,mvincinl-\",'' that "more than a }lreponderance of
the evidenep" be fonnd aguin~t him and that his "~:,ruilt
must IH' clearly estahli;;hed." In Rc Hwt . wn, -t~ rtall
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lli7, 158 P. 77S; In Re Riutts & Roger~,, :22 Dah :1GG,
ti~ P. 913; In Be Jlc{'nllo11·9h, 97 Uah 5:33, 95 1'. :.\llJ.
Although the l'ourt, in ib deeision in
recognize~

•·the

establi~heo:l

case,

rule" that. dear und convinc-

ing evidence is t·cquired, it has
In~tea.d,

thi~

110t

followed that rule.

it hafl affirmed eonvietion by the usc nl' infer-

ence~

which, four

being

~nbstantial

Four

,Year~

~UJI\]llinn

~·car~

Rgn, \I'L•re regarded by it as not

evidencP of fraud and undue influence.

ago, the Court rejh·tPd the rule that a pre-

of tlrif' kind <'onld only be overcome by dear

and convincing evidence, and instead held that the presuruption could be overcome by a
of the evidence. In

ne Swtlli'8

The preRenl deci:;;ion

nH.Te prepondcrane~·

}!,'stale, at J-'agc G90.

stale~

that the concern or the

Court i,; "whether reasonable minds" migl1t infer from
the fads sufficient force to meet "'the required slandar•l
of proof." lt

i~ intere.~ting

to note that in thi6

deC'i~ion,

a.-; in the decision in the ·will eonteRt rase, there has been
a dissenL each time reaching a dirf'etly opposite re::mlt
from that reached by the majority opinion <.'oneernmg
the inferences to be drawn from the faets eoneernir1g
respondent'::: condud.
This might be of" no importance if, in tile present
t·a~l',

the Court

\Hh

indulging in "consideral1le latilttde"

to tlJC members of the Bar and the Bar

Conunis~ion

upon
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ihe familiar ground that they, as the fact finders, had

a superior opportunH;v- to observe the witnesses and to
determine credibility.
Such is not the case here, however, becau~e this
entire proceeding has been based and conducted upon a
written record made in 1954 under completely diJferent
cimumstances Kith completely different issues and involving oomplctely different partie~;. Although respondent has made himself available J'or unlimited cros:H~xa.m
ination, no member of the Bar hw; ever asked him a
single question from the time these proceedings began.
The first hearing, by an iJ1vestigating wmmittee of
the Bar, was ex pa-rte and \Yithout notice of any kind
to respondent, although the Revised Rules of Discipline
of the Ctah State Bar1 and the regulations promulgated
under Section

~4

of such Revised Hules, elearly contem-

vlate notice, and the opportWiity to L'xplain informally
thE' quest.ioned conduct.
Thereafter, the Prosecuting Committee and the Trial
Committee had thl' opportlmity to question respondent
in order better to judge his credibility, to determine his
motive~ or to learn whether it would be just as reasonable

to drav.; good inf('JTlll'l'~, in~tf'ad of evil inferences, from
the Jnd.nal rebtionship exi,;ting between him and his
client.
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The respondent had told of his training and background, in

rc~ponse

to questions from his counsel. He

had already repeatedly

dcni~'d,

by oral testimony and

hy written pleading, I he accusations first made against
him Ly the complaint in tlte will contc::;t ca,;e.
\Vc suggest that each member of the Bm· who has
been concerned \lrith this (·rtse dwse to remain silent and
to ask no r1uestions of respondent be<.'au;;c all shared

the view of the chief counsel for Ute Prosecuting Committee that the entire ismP in this case was a legal issue
-namely, the effect of the presumption announced by
the Court in the Swan ea;;e.
Thus, at every stqJ ol' thi::J proceeding, there has
been an avoidanee of an evidentiary l"inding of fraud
and undue influenec and a ,;.;ubstiiution of the statement
that the presumption of fraud and undlle influence applies. For the Court now t.o approve the recommendation
of the Hoard of Bar t:onnnissioners, 11ithont either evidence or finding ol' fraud and undue iul'luence, is lo

~m

nounee a new rule in disciplinary vroceedings.
l-ndcr such a rule, lawyers who cnkr into business
ventures with their

client~

will be mbjecting tbcmselves

to future discipline nnless they enn prove a 1wgativc --that is, prove that tiloey did not take advantage of tlw
client with

\I hom

t l1cy enjoyed a <.'onfidential relationship.
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Under the rule of this cru:;e, the burden will henceforth be placed upon the attorney to exoncratf' himself,
rather than upon the Bar t.o prove his guilt.
It is res1wctfully suggested that the Court did not

intend, by is decision, to change the long-standing rule
concerning disciplinary proceedings in thit:

.~tate.

POINT II.
THE PUNISR~\iE~T RECOII'nrE::-<DED BY THE BAR,
AND DJ£CREED BY THE COURT, IS UNJUST AND OPPRESSIVE IN VIEW OF THE RECORD AND THE CIRCU!IiS'TANCES OF THIS CASE A:\D I~ CG:ilPARISON WITH
WHAT HAS BEEN DECREED IN EARLIER DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS.

Disciplinary proceedings are traditionally not designed to punish the aooused, but, af'. stated by this Court
in In Re Han""n, they "are intended more in the nature
of an admonition to the aoou;;cd and to protect the public
against future transgressions upon the part of the
attorney ... "
l<'or more than six year,;, ref'pondent ha~ lived, and
attempted to practice law, under the cloud of the aceusations embodied in

thi~

proceeding.

rn April, ]!I;J+. the trial court in tlK·

Sll'illl

ease filM

n lengU1y ('ondellluntor~ opinion, arRusing n>o<pmu!ent ,,r
lhe ('OIIIlllio<sion or fraud. 'l'liitl opinion rereind \\-ide-
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~pread

new8papl'l' and radio publi(·ity. J•;ach recordation

of a docwnent in that proceeding or in the disciplinary
proceeding that follo1nKl haH received Cljttal attention

from the press.
It i:; difficult to seP how the respondent could be

more thoroughly ''adrnoni:shed'' or l10w he could receive
more pointed and thorough admonition than that which
has already lJeen visited upon him.

Re8pondcnt is lil years of age and his health .is
impaired. A wspension for one year, at his age, is far
more 6CVCn\

lw.r~il

and oppreiiflive than would be a

similar term imposed upon a younger lawyer with the

greater part of his professional life before him.
\Vhile it i" recognized that each

ca~e

on its own facts, an examination of Ute

mud he decided
dc('i~ion::>

of !Iii><

Court in disciplinary proceedings in the past 25 year:o
does not reveal a penall,v

a~

relatively :;evere as that

imposed in tills case. The earlier ea;;es are furthPr wortl1y
or note because in each of them there was iu\-olved a

transgression or written rules of conduct, or a 10tatutory
violation, with evidentiary proof.
.Precedent may be of little

a;;~i~tance,

but it i,; im-

pressive to note the difference in the method of review
and penalty imposed in In Re illcCi!liOIIffll, !1/ Litalt :);;:;.
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95 P. 2d 13, as eompared with the review and penally
in the present case.
The l.1cCullough case involved a :;erie~ of charges
relating to sollcitation of personal injury litigation p<:rsonally and through a paid solicitor and giving false
testimony under oath in a contempt proceeding. The
court made a meticulous review of the evidBnce and con-

duded that there was dear proof of solicitation on one
charge, but in considering another charge the court,
while recognizing the evidcm:e pointed toward guilt,
f'tated;
"However, the evidence adduced is consistent
. with Jack of knowledge upon the part of
plaintiff ... " of the conduct of the alleged soli-

citor.
The court was, U1erefore, giving the accused in that

case the benefit of such favorable inference a~ might
be drawn from the evidence but no ~uch benefit has been
afforded the

re~pondent

in this case.

Althoug-h till' reeord o:howed dearly the charge of
o;olidtation upon McCullough, and further showed conduct de;;erving of the censure of the Court concerning
the use of a paid solicitor, and although the Court found
hin1 guilty ol" unprofessional condurt by withholding
i nl"ormation from a lower court, he neYertheless received

a

6UBpcn~ion

of but 11ine montl1~ from the pm("tice of law.
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If the Court in this rase condude::; that the finding

of guilt should be reaffirmed, it is respeetfully suggested
that the true purpose o£ this proceeding 11 ill be properly
served without the intpoi<ition of the penally of a one
year suspenswn.

Such a penalty, in this ~ase, i" not far removed,
in its ultimate effect, [rom dic;bannent. l!Jven if respondent should later· be recommended for reinstatement after
suspension, there ·would be but. little of his ]Jrofe<~sional
life rernaining within which to attempt to rebuild his
practice, in view of

hi<~

age and his health.

:\o good rea.6on appear" 1dry the Court could not
decide for it~eH, apart from the recommcndalion of the
Bar, what woulo:l con~titute ju::;tiee under these circum~lances, to the end that the prrhlie would reeeive ib protection and the re~pondent, his admonition.

Respectfully submitted,

JOH.\' H. 81\0W and
HAROLD G. CHHl~Tr;:;-.;-sgN

701 Continental Bank Building
Halt Lake City, Utah
Att01uey8 for nespondent.
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